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An Up-Close Perspective: The Enforcement of
Federal Immigration Laws by
State and Local Police
Maria Fernanda Parra-Chico 1
INTRODUCTION
The attacks of September 11, 2001, evoked a debate over whether, and to
what extent, the federal government should employ the resources and
efforts of local law enforcement agencies to carry out U.S. immigration law
mandates. 2 Today, state and local governments—working closely with
federal authorities—are enacting laws and ordinances seeking to increase
the regulation of noncitizens. 3 Such regulation exhibits a clash of
authorities: the federal government enforcing immigration law as a foreign
policy issue, and state and local governments enforcing immigration law via
their own laws and ordinances. 4 Across the country, state and local
governments are enacting laws and ordinances that criminalize harboring,
transporting, or hiring undocumented immigrants; that prevent the provision
of state assistance to undocumented families; that impose fines on landlords
who rent to undocumented persons; and that authorize local police to
question the immigration status of anyone detained or arrested. 5 The
federal government is essentially subcontracting the enforcement of
immigration law to state and local sectors, through the criminalization of
immigrants and the delegation of criminal and civil immigration law
enforcement. These changes have wrongly placed city, county, and state
local law enforcement at the intersection of criminal justice and
immigration law. 6
The Supreme Court has held that Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution
grants Congress and the federal government the sole authority to enforce
immigration law. 7 Localities can only legally enforce immigration law
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when they have signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the
federal government, deputizing local police officers to enforce immigration
law. 8 Yet some localities persist in enforcing civil immigration law even
without an MOA.
The state of Washington, generally known to be an immigrant-friendly
state, 9 has not signed an MOA with the federal government to deputize its
police to enforce immigration law. 10 However, some police are still
enforcing immigration law both by partnering with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and by acting independently as immigration
agents, without any basis in federal or state law for their actions. Though
MOAs provide police with lists of their responsibilities and duties with
respect to immigration enforcement, the state of Washington is wise not to
adopt an MOA. 11
Local enforcement of civil immigration laws raises many daunting legal,
logistical, and resource issues for state and local agencies and the diverse
communities they serve. The role that local law enforcement plays within
the immigrant community should be guided and assessed to promote the
well-being of all. This article will clarify local law enforcement’s role in
the enforcement of civil immigration law and will illustrate why these
officials should not act as immigration agents or adhere to policies that
repress the immigrant community. This article presents proposals for
reform that thwart local agendas to enforce anti-immigrant laws, enhance
public safety, and raise awareness about issues affecting immigrants and
their communities.
Part I of this article presents a historical and legal analysis of the
development of laws in the federal, state, and local sectors. Part II
discusses the negative consequences of immigration enforcement at the
state and local level and examines how this enforcement undermines the
relationship between local law enforcement and the communities it serves.
Part III presents the state of Washington as a case study to further delineate
how the encroachment of local law enforcement into the immigration
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arena—when not guided by an affirmative, immigrant-friendly approach—
can criminalize immigrants and lead to exhorbitant costs on a fiscal and
social level. Part IV proposes several changes at both the national and local
levels, including a ban on the enforcement of immigration law by police
officers and tactics that will rebuild trust in and dispel fear of the police.
Ultimately, the section proposes a remedial course of action to ensure that
citizens and community members can benefit from the positive influence
that police should play in their communities.

I. THE HISTORY, LEGALITY, AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES OF LOCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW
A. Legal Uncertainty as to the Role of Local Police Enforcement
Before 9/11, local police officers rarely enforced immigration law. 12 It
was accepted law and practice that police could enforce only criminal
immigration violations and not civil immigration violations. 13 Criminal
violations include reentry after deportation, failure to depart after an order
of removal, and most crimes involving moral turpitude or categorized as
aggravated felonies. 14 Civil violations include illegal presence and failure
to depart after the expiration of a temporary visa. 15 The division between
civil and criminal immigration law enforcement was established by the
court in Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, the MOA provisions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, 16 and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
All three indicate that local police authorities could not enforce civil
immigration laws. 17
However, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, issues of national security and
immigration raised the question of whether local police could assist with
immigration enforcement. 18 The DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, under
Attorney General John Ashcroft, issued a memorandum that stated that
local officers have “inherent authority” to enforce both criminal and civil
provisions of federal immigration law. 19 The memorandum, made public
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after a controversial struggle to obtain it, revealed a significant shift in DOJ
immigration policy. 20 It concluded that states, as sovereign entities, have
the authority to enforce all federal laws and that “federal statutory law poses
no obstacle to the authority of state police to arrest aliens on the basis of
civil deportability.” 21
Despite information in the DOJ memorandum suggesting otherwise, state
action regarding immigration enforcement must be consistent with federal
authority. 22 Federal law states that the federal government and Congress
have the sole authority to enforce civil immigration law. 23 Local police do
not have the authority to enforce civil immigration law unless mandated by
federal law, pursuant to an MOA.
B. Federal and State Overlap of Immigration Law Enforcement: Due
Process and Developments
Today we see a blurring of lines of authority between federal and local
law enforcement of both criminal and civil immigration laws. 24 Proposed
federal legislation would declare local law enforcement officers to have
inherent power to enforce immigration laws. 25 This would in essence
merge the immigration-enforcement sector with the criminal justice sector.
This section identifies the due process issues involved when police venture
into immigration regulation, and it identifies problems with the melding of
authority between traditional police officer duties and immigration agents’
duties.
1. Due Process Issues
While there are many parallels between criminal procedure and
immigration law, the two areas invoke vastly different constitutional
protections. 26 The rights of criminal suspects are embodied in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments; immigration law is governed by the Due
Process Clause. 27 In criminal law, police can consensually communicate
with an individual without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
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forcibly stop and briefly detain a person when there is reasonable suspicion,
and arrest an individual when issued a warrant or with probable cause
(when the facts and circumstances indicate an individual has or is
committing a criminal offense). 28 Immigration law, on the other hand,
grants authorized officers the authority to interrogate individuals and to
make warrantless arrests of anyone they believe is unlawfully in the United
States. 29 Thus civil immigration investigations do not necessarily afford the
same level of protection as criminal investigations. Individuals may be
questioned by police because of their race, skin color, name, or the language
they speak, and subsequently be arrested for a civil immigration violation.
If local police arrest individuals based on a civil deportation order or a
listing in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, such
arrests are likely to be based on evidence that falls short of the requisite
probable cause standard. 30 If immigration status is to become a question of
importance in criminal enforcement, then care must be taken to ensure that
the evidence supports a criminal enforcement. Violations of individual
constitutional rights, which are more likely to occur when local police
enforce immigration law, should be disconcerting to all Americans.
2. Developments: Devices Used to Blur Federal and State Authority
Disregarding the constitutional implications, the DOJ continues to put
pressure on state and local governments via particular mechanisms and
strategies. These developments reflect a “sea of change in the traditional
understanding that federal immigration laws are enforced exclusively by
federal agents.” 31
a) Memoranda of Agreement
Nonfederal law enforcement agencies may enter into MOAs with the
federal government, allowing the agencies’ deputized officers to enforce
criminal and civil immigration law. 32 In effect, section 287(g) of the INA
provides that state and local authorities may take on roles traditionally
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reserved for the federal government. 33 The U.S. Attorney General, at the
request of the state or local entity, enters into an MOA with the entity and
directly supervises the law enforcement group. 34 Currently, there are sixtythree active MOAs across the United States, and the waitlist is long. 35 ICE
credits the MOA program with identifying more than seventy thousand
individuals, most already incarcerated, who are suspected of being in the
country “illegally.” 36
The basic training standards required by the MOA for local law
enforcement officers are controversial. 37 The ICE training course for MOA
officers typically takes four weeks, whereas federal immigration officers are
trained for five months. 38 Generally, ICE officers must attend a seventeenweek Immigration Agent Basic Training, and agents in the field complete
additional on-the-job training. 39 Thus, there is an increased likelihood of
racial profiling and civil rights violations when local law enforcement
officers are minimally trained, in comparison to federal immigration agents,
to enforce immigration laws. 40
MOAs grant local law enforcement the authority to independently do the
following: interrogate individuals in order to determine probable cause for
an immigration arrest; prepare immigration detainers and affidavits; take
sworn statements; transport aliens under arrest; notify ICE within twentyfour hours of any arrests made under this authority; prepare a Notice to
Appear (NTA) for immigration purposes; and assist in pre- and post-arrest
case processing of individuals taken into custody by ICE. 41 The power to
issue a detainer is one of the most troubling delegations of authority by the
MOAs. A detainer, in essence, means that any individual, suspected of
violating an immigration law cannot be released on bond from jail until
federal immigration agents determine the individual’s immigration status. 42
Thus, law enforcement officers can arrest an individual, and under MOA
authority, place an “immigration detainer” on him with the belief that the
person is an undocumented alien. 43 Racial profiling is likely in such a
context.
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MOAs result from negotiation between the federal government and states
or localities for delegation of civil immigration law enforcement
authority. 44 Since the local law enforcement agency’s powers, duties, and
duration of authority are subject to negotiation, it is quite possible that an
MOA can be agreed upon that partly protects individual civil rights. 45
Provisions for proper training of officers and procedures for complaints and
redress when the laws are improperly applied would go a long way toward
protections of individual civil rights. But even these possible additions to
the negotiated terms of the MOA do not rectify the danger MOAs pose. 46
Unfortunately, MOAs are indicia of an anti-immigrant trend to detain and
deport anyone suspected of violating immigration law. The flawed logic of
MOAs is that allowing local police to detain a large number of people for a
broad range of minor offenses, including civil immigration offenses, makes
it easier to catch the small percentage of undocumented persons who are
violent criminals. 47 Correct logic recognizes that “criminals”—those who
threaten public safety—are no more likely to be present in the immigrant
population than in the general population. At the same time, many criminal
violations, such as theft, assault, and fraud, trigger immigration violations.
48
When MOAs make immigration enforcement a police officer’s duty,
safeguards must be in place to assure that individuals merely unlawfully
present in the United States are not unfairly equated with individuals guilty
of a deportable criminal offense for which they are deemed a threat to
public safety.
b). The Expansion of the NCIC Database
Currently, police may access the FBI’s criminal database, the NCIC, for
everyday stops and encounters. Since 2001, the INS has begun to enter
civil immigration information into the NCIC. 49 With access to the NCIC
database, local law enforcement can query the immigration status of
detained indivdiuals. This results in noncitizens being arrested for
suspected civil immigration violations. 50
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The NCIC database, a computerized tool used to assist law enforcement
officers in identifying criminal suspects, contains “subfiles” of information
on an expansive range of criminal activity listings. 51 Prior to August 2003,
the listings pertinent to immigration enforcement were limited to criminal
immigration violations such as re-entry after deportation, which is an
immigration felony. 52 Starting in August 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft
announced the addition of new categories to the NCIC database, including
categories for people who have committed civil immigration violations. 53
Filling the NCIC database with information about millions of people with
minor civil immigration violations results in poor data management and
enforcement problems. 54 While the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) reports that an immigration status query takes fifteen minutes, some
local law enforcement officials have reported that it takes several hours to
get the results of a single query. 55 This delay results in part because
immigration records have high levels of inaccuracy. 56 As stated by the
National Immigration Forum, a “factor compounding the inaccuracy
problem was the decision of the Attorney General in 2003 to exempt [the]
NCIC database from the accuracy requirements of the Privacy Act, in effect
relieving the government of responsibility for ensuring that records are
accurate, timely, and reliable.” 57 Based on these concerns, the Committee
of the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) recommended that civil
detainers be removed from the NCIC database. 58
Moreover, local law enforcement lack clarity regarding the appropriate
use of the database and training regarding the expansion of the database.
The federal government has not provided guidance to non-MOA states and
localities on the proper use of the NCIC database. 59 Consequently, these
non-MOA police officers overstep their authority by arresting individuals
without probable cause or detaining them without reasonable suspicion. For
example, if the police run a name through the NCIC database and find that
an individual is listed in either the absconder subfile—meaning a removal
order was issued for an individual—or National Security Entry-Exit
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Registration System (NSEERS) subfile, the police are not automatically
entitled to a criminal warrant because neither removal orders nor violations
of the NSEERS program are crimes. 60 However, according to an
Appleseed report, “it often appears that police are making arrests in cases
where there is a match in the NCIC database, without the actual criminal
warrant. Accordingly many police officers may be stepping outside the
scope of their authority.” 61 Similarly, the Immigration Committee of the
Major Cities Chiefs Association stated that “[t]he inclusion of civil
detainers on the system has created confusion for local police agencies and
subjected them to possible liability for exceeding their authority by
arresting a person upon the basis of a mere civil detainer.” 62
The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) conducted an analysis of the use of
the NCIC database by state and local police forces. It found that of the
20,876 immigration hits from state and local agencies from 2002 to 2004,
the error rate—that is, the percent of hits where ICE could not confirm the
information—was 42 percent. 63 The MPI also found that 85 percent of all
immigration violators identified in a statistically significant sample of the
NCIC hits were from Latin America and 71 percent were from Mexico. 64
This information indicates that the NCIC files are not being used to further
prevent criminal activity or a targeted antiterrorism agenda, as the DOJ
policy proffers. 65 In addition, immigration attorneys are ever more hesitant
to send fingerprint checks to the police when seeking a background check
because ICE may apprehend the individual if the NCIC check results in a
positive “hit.” 66 Thus, the NCIC database facilitates unfettered local police
authority to enforce immigration law and disrupts the designation of
authority between federal agents and local police.
With or without an MOA, “[w]hen state and local law enforcement
officials are not adequately trained and informed to ascertain the difference
between a bonafide asylum seeker and an individual who may be
fraudulently trying to circumvent the [immigration] system,” the lack of
training and guidance for local law enforcement in immigration matters
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disrupts the nation’s public safety agenda and burdens the immigration
enforcement system. 67

III. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION LAWS
The inappropriate use of NCIS and MOAs indicates that local law
enforcement officers are diverting their time from the promotion of a public
safety agenda to the enforcement of civil immigration law veiled under a
national security agenda. This section will outline the problems when local
police enforce immigration laws outside of an MOA.
A. Inadequate Funding for Additional Obligations Imposed on Local Law
Enforcement.
Local police involvement in an immigration agenda is not funded by the
federal government. Consequently, scarce resources are diverted from more
critical law enforcement needs, which undermines community policing
programs. 68 According to the MCCA, “[s]ince the creation of DHS, federal
funding for major city police departments has been greatly reduced. Local
agencies have had to take on more responsibilities in areas that have
traditionally been handled by the FBI, whose resources are now focused on
counter-terrorism efforts.” 69 Further, given current resource levels, the cost
of personnel, facilities, and equipment for local agencies to address the
twelve million illegal immigrants currently residing in the United States
would be crushing. 70 A costly investment in immigration enforcement
creates a budget-revenue shortfall for cities that are also dealing with
financial issues related to transportation, waste management, parks, schools,
and libraries. 71 Thus, costly state- and local-level immigration agendas
often allow for a misguided appropriation of money and resources. 72
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B. The Problem of Costly Litigation
Another problem associated with police enforcement of immigration laws
is the danger of costly litigation. With immigrant plaintiffs proving
successful in courtrooms nationwide, states and cities are left burdened with
litigation expenses. 73 Local agencies lack clear authority to enforce
immigration laws, are limited in their ability to arrest without a warrant, are
barred from racial profiling, and lack the training to enforce complex
federal immigration laws. Therefore, local police agencies that choose to
enforce federal immigration law face an increased risk of being held civilly
liable. 74
The “Chandler Roundup” and the expense of its ensuing litigation is an
example of local police acting pursuant to the DOJ’s finding of inherent
authority—supposedly giving local law enforcement the ability to enforce
immigration law—and losing in court. 75 Police officers from the town of
Chandler, Arizona, joined federal agents in a five-day operation resulting in
the deportation of 432 Hispanic immigrants. The City of Chandler paid
four hundred thousand dollars in a legal settlement after the plaintiffs
alleged that the undocumented immigrants were stopped and questioned
exclusively because of their apparent Mexican descent. 76 Later, Arizona
Attorney General Grant Wood stated that individuals in fact were stopped
“for no other apparent reason than their skin color or Mexican appearance
or use of the Spanish language.” 77 Furthermore, the Chandler Roundup led
to the filing of a thirty-five million dollar civil rights lawsuit brought by
U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents against the City of Chandler. 78
By enacting legislation that directly prohibits local police from enforcing
immigration laws not mandated by law (e.g., “Don’t Ask” ordinances) and
excluding the presence of ICE in local police business involving civil
immigration violations, 79 state and local governments can avoid the high
litigation costs, which directly burden the community and taxpayers. 80
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C. De-emphasis on Criminal Investigations
Ultimately, the implementation of practices that allow state and local
police officers to enforce immigration laws via their own in-house,
nonfederally mandated programs may “de-emphasize certain types of
criminal investigations in an effort to focus on enforcing immigration law,
which would divert law enforcement authorities from their primary
duties.” 81
Judith Golub, of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association, stated that “[i]n many communities, response times to 911
calls are dangerously slow and police are no longer able to even investigate
certain crime. Law enforcement officials in these communities need to
spend more time enforcing laws that only they can enforce, and need more
resources to protect the neighborhoods in which they live and work.” 82
The types of offenses that trigger immigration consequences include
crimes involving moral turpitude (e.g., certain forms of assault, theft, fraud,
abuse) and relating to controlled substances and firearms, aggravated
felonies (e.g., murder, rape, drug trafficking, robbery, burglary, deceit,
failure to appear, illegal reentry), domestic violence, stalking, child abuse,
fraudulent document use, and other specific offenses. 83 These types of
crimes will result in the arrest and ultimate deportion of an individual.
When police focus on their job—the enforcement of criminal violations and
enhancement of public safety—it makes sense that some individuals who
are undocumented will be arrested. However, arresting someone merely
because of a civil immigration violation does not mean that crime will be
prevented. For example, suppose that when an individual called to report a
crime of domestic violence, police were required to check whether the
witness and his family had compulsory liability insurance on their vehicle
or whether their taxes had been filed. 84 Quite possibly, individuals would
adhere more fervently to these regulatory requirements, but cooperation by
the populace to control crime would rapidly decline. 85
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D. The Problem of Racial Profiling
Not surprisingly, racial profiling exists in cases involving ICE officers
and border patrol agents. 86 Immigration officers familiar with the case law
are experienced enough to create prefabricated profiles that will convince
courts that the officers’ stops were not based solely upon race or ethnic
appearance. 87 After stopping an individual, it is easy for an immigration
officer to strengthen his case for reasonable suspicion through interrogation
and then communicate the necessary articulable facts after the fact. 88
Without proper boundaries and designation of authority, state and local
police officers may also abuse their authority by using the same tactics that
immigration officers use in enforcing criminal and civil immigration laws.
Naturally, the issue of racial profiling in local police enforcement of
immigration law is complicated because there is no ironclad formula for
formulating reasonable suspicion when detaining someone for a civil
immigration violation. 89 Nevertheless, local law enforcement should invest
energy in arresting criminals, not individuals “suspected” of violating civil
immigration laws based on their appearance, employment, or association
with others who are undocumented or arrested for criminal matters.
E. Immigration Detainers
Another area where joint collaboration beteen ICE and police requires
close scrutiny and observation is in local jails. Under current practice, if a
police officer brings an undocumented noncitizen to jail following an arrest,
a stay at the jail—regardless of the length of the stay and even if no charges
are ulimtately filed—will most likely lead to the deportation of the
noncitizen once an immigration detainer is issued.
Today, many immigrants come into ICE custody due to a violation of a
state or local law. Under many state laws, the jailer who processes the
arrestee in jail is obligated to report to ICE if they have reason to believe an
individual is a noncitizen. 90 Police and jailers flag individuals by picking
out those with foreign sounding names or spotting those who list themselves
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as being foreign born on intake forms upon arrival at the jail. 91 It is
believed by many ICE officers, police, and jailers that a jailer possesses
discretion to make a report to ICE in any case involving an undocumented
noncitizen. Currently, there are no federal or state laws providing guidance
in this area of discretionary reporting; there are no definitive court cases
either. 92
After ICE receives a report of an individual in custody, who may or may
not be a noncitizen, ICE almost always issues an immigration detainer by
transmitting an I-247—the immigration detainer—to the jailer. 93 The I-247
form is the immigration detainer, or “immigration hold.” 94 An immigration
detainer is a notice to the jail that they must tell ICE when they are releasing
the individual. It permits the jail to hold a person for up to forty-eight hours
after release for ICE to come and act on the arrest. 95 The immigration
detainer prevents the immigrant from being released on bond, and it ensures
that the immigrant will be taken into immigration custody upon release. 96
ICE cannot extend the forty-eight-hour period, and ICE must appear in
person within forty-eight hours to assume physical custody of the
immigrant. If not, the jail must release the individual. 97
Prosecutors must charge any individual once in custody with a crime
within forty-eight hours (not counting weekends and holidays). 98 If a police
officer or a prosecutor does file criminal charges, then the individual must
be released if (1) the charges are dropped, (2) the individual is granted bail,
(3) the case is won, or (4) the sentence is complete. 99 However, in many
localities with large immigrant populations, ICE officials have a constant
and vigilant presence at the jails, interviewing immigrants daily. 100
Because ICE and police work together, ICE will inquire about his or her
immigration status and transfer him or her into immigration custody 101
when police flag the individuals who they suspect are noncitizens,
regardless of whether the noncitizen is charged, the charges are dropped, or
jail terms are completed. Thus, many immigration detainers are being
placed on individuals before they are even charged with a crime.
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Several complications arise from the immigration detainer process. The
most frequent is the violation of the forty-eight-hour time period between
the issuance of an immigration detainer and ICE assuming physical custody
of the individual. Reports are surfacing nationwide of extraordinarily long
lapses before the noncitizen is transferred from a local jail to an
immigration detention facility. 102 In one case, a young Mexican woman
waited three months in jail to be transferred to a detention facility after
being arrested for driving without a license. 103 The possibility for habeas
corpus petitions are ripe 104 —violations of the terms of the immigration
detainer can result in civil liability for the jailer under 42 USC § 1983, as
well. 105 However, immigrants in custody are often unaware of relief
mechanisms in place.
In the past, ICE would place holds on people for violations of criminal
immigration laws such as theft or domestic violence. Today, the flagging of
immigrants for civil immigration violations reveals another new and
worrisome trend that highlights an agenda to arrest, detain, and deport
anyone suspected of violating any immigration law. In the most frequently
reported cases, individuals are arrested for driving without a license and
subsequently taken into custody where ICE then places holds on them. 106
Not only does arrest for minor offenses followed by a flag for ICE to
impose a hold create evidence that may fall short of the requisite probable
cause standard for the arrest, but it also calls into question police tactics if
immigrants are being stopped based on their appearance. Police are able to
consensually communicate with an individual without reasonable suspicion,
and at times, they may inquire into the person’s immigration status. If the
individual responds or seems agitated, arguably, police may have enough
evidence to determine that there is probable that an individual is unlawfully
present in the United States. And though police, unless mandated by an
MOA, should not be arresting individuals for civil immigration violations,
police are doing so in localities where there is a lack of clarity in
immigration enforcement. 107
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ICE, police, and jailers should work together to arrest, flag, place
immigration detainers on, and subsequently deport individuals who are
guilty of a criminal immigration violation. When individuals are picked up
by police for a mere civil immigration violation and subsequently taken to
jail to procure their deportation, an anti-immigrant agenda is highlighted
that is not only frightening to immigrants but that also threatens our
constitutional guarantees.
F. Distrust of Police: The Downfall of Crime Prevention and Public Safety
When no ironclad formula exists for determining reasonable suspicion in
police enforcement of immigration law and when local police enforce
immigration law without clear federal authority designated by law, a heavy
burden is placed on the community. Crime prevention and public safety
suffer, and distrust of local police becomes a constant repercussion of local
police action. Undocumented individuals are extremely wary of reporting
criminal activity or assisting police in criminal investigations when police
damage the relationship with the communities they serve. 108 The fear of
deportation for noncitizens often deters them and their family members
from reporting abuses, making it more difficult for police to effectively do
their jobs. 109
According to the National Immigration Forum, “[i]t is the need to
effectively protect the whole community that has led scores of police
departments to reject policies that would expand their role in federal
immigration law enforcement.” 110 For example, Attorney General Wood of
Arizona stated that “[i]t is mutual trust and respect that will in turn enhance
the ability of local police to obtain from willing citizens the information and
support necessary to carry out their mission to protect and serve.” 111 To
promote trust, police should refrain from enforcing immigration laws. As
examples, two states and several localities have adopted procedures that
discourage local involvement in enforcement of immigration laws. 112
Sometimes localities address these issues through resolutions, city

IMMIGRATION

An Up-Close Perspective

ordinances, special orders from the police chief, or departmental policies. 113
Many of these measures stipulate that the localities’ funds cannot directly or
indirectly be used for the purpose of enforcing immigration laws. 114 Such
measures create trust.
G. Immigrants as Victims
1. Afraid to Step Forward
If immigrants are reluctant to report crime because of collaboration
between ICE and local police, criminals will be encouraged to further
victimize immigrant communities. 115 Police should maintain a relationship
of trust with the local population, regardless of citizenship, so that victims
of crime can step forward without the fear of revealing their status. 116 At
the forefront of this concern are victims of domestic violence. In passing
the Violence Against Women’s Act (VAWA), Congress recognized the
need to address the concerns of battered immigrant women by allowing
them to obtain legal immigration status without having to be dependent on
their abusers 117 These women will only be safe if courts issue protective
orders against the abusers. In order to facilitate this, police must effectively
assist these women; therefore, part of the job of the police is to gain the
trust and faith of battered immigrant women. 118
If police are equated with ICE agents, entire households of battered
women and children will be reluctant to take initial steps to become
independent of their abuser out of fear of the police—the individuals
assigned to “serve and protect.” Many women are worried that reporting
their abusers may conclude with deportation of themselves and their
abusers. Even more troubling is when abusers continue to batter, relying on
the threat of deportation. For example, in 1998, an immigrant woman in
New Jersey, Elena Gonzalez, was found murdered in the basement of her
apartment. 119 Elena’s friends reported that the murderer, her former
boyfriend, consistently threatened to report her to ICE if she did not do
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what she was told. 120 When an immigrant woman has to choose between
her safety and the likelihood of deportation, crime prevention is difficult to
achieve and the immigrant community is less safe.
2. Hate Crimes
Hate crimes toward immigrants are on the rise. A heightened antiimmigrant sentiment has also blocked immigration reform, spurred antiimmigrant propaganda, and sought to turn local police into immigration law
enforcers. 121 Undocumented individuals are extremely vulnerable targets
for hate crimes because they may not speak English, they are
undocumented workers, they may keep cash on their persons and in their
homes, and they are likely to be reluctant to report crimes to law
enforcement. 122 The FBI reports that anti-Hispanic hate crimes rose by
almost 35 percent between 2003 and 2006. According to President and
General Counsel of MALDEF, John Trasviña, “[t]he FBI report should
serve as a wake up call to our nation’s leaders to take action on
comprehensive immigration reform, reduce tensions, and safeguard the
basic civil rights and liberties of all Americans.” 123
The Southern Poverty Law Center produced a report outlining the
dramatic increase of hate crimes, particularly those directed at Hispanic
individuals. 124 For example, Victor Hernandez, a Honduran immigrant
dishwasher, was walking home from work when he was kicked into
unconsciousness by teenagers who robbed him of $160. 125 The two teens
arrested told police they were “amigo shopping”—seeking vulnerable
Hispanic workers to rob. 126
Another example of the intentional
victimization of undocumented individuals occurred in Tifton, Georgia,
where six Mexican immigrants—men, women, and children—were
murdered and at least five others badly injured. 127 A group of robbers had
rampaged through four trailer parks known for housing immigrant workers
and murdered these men, women, and children. The trailer parks are well
known for home invasions, and months prior to the murders, over 20 homes
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there had been invaded. 128 A founding member of the Minutemen stated
that the point of these kinds of hate crimes is to “make every illegal alien
feel the heat of being a person without status.” 129
The lack of trust between immigrants and police sets the stage for the
persistent recurrence of hate crimes. Local police involvement in
immigration enforcement serves as a deterrent for undocumented
individuals who are seeking to report crimes, and the upswing in hate
crimes directed at immigrants results in an entire community indirectly
affected by violence. 130
3. Trafficking
Police must be thoroughly trained so that they possess the expertise
required to handle extremely complicated cases, such as trafficking, that
typically involve a high number of undocumented individuals. Proper
training of police officers is necessary to avoid responses that revictimize
victims and decrease their willingness to serve as witnesses against the
traffickers. 131 For example, in July 1997, fifty-eight deaf and mute
Mexican workers were discovered living as slaves in New York. According
to the National Council of La Raza, the workers “were tricked into coming
to the United States and were absolutely exploited by their smugglers. . . .
[T]hey were beaten, raped, traded, and shocked into submission with stun
guns. . . . [T]he immigrants feared going to the police because they were
undocumented and their smugglers threatened to report them to INS.” 132
None of them had contacted the police because they feared being reported
to the immigration authorities, making it apparent that police departments
needed to actively engage with and reach out to immigrant communities in
order to properly establish trust. 133
Without police assistance and cooperation, communities cannot work
together to prevent such atrocities and punish perpetrators. A predictable
chilling effect on law enforcement, as it is being carried out nationally, will
result if a noncitizen, lawfully or unlawfully present in the United States,
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believes that calling the police to report a crime is likely to lead to police
questioning regarding immigration status. 134
For the reasons discussed in this section, local police enforcement of
immigration law should be avoided. Enforcement of immigration law is
costly and will likely result in litigation. Further, if the local police’s role is
to serve and protect the community, it does not bode well if members of the
community are distrustful of the police and afraid to report crime. Because
undocumented citizens are often the most vulnerable to becoming victims
of crime, as shown through the examples above, they are not being
protected when they are afraid to contact their local police.

IV.WASHINGTON: A NON-MOA STATE
Washington is not an MOA state, meaning that state and local police are
not deputized to enforce immigration law. 135 Further, the Ninth Circuit has
held that state and local officers are not authorized to make arrests for civil
violations. 136 Finally, Washington State Patrol Regulation 1.00.040 states
that officers shall not stop, detain, interrogate, or place an immigration hold
on any person solely for the purpose of ascertaining immigration status. If
police arrest someone for a criminal violation, officers have discretion to
notify ICE if there is reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the
person is undocumented, other than a person’s nationality, name, or ability
to communicate in English. 137
Because an individual’s name, nationality, and ability to communicate in
English are not factors that should be used to reach the requisite standard
under the regulation, the reason for which a police officer would have
reasonable suspicion to notify ICE is a slippery slope. Under Regulation
1.00.040, it seems that the only way a police officer could suspect that a
person is undocumented would be if the individual stated to the police
officer that he or she is undocumented; if the police officer called ICE or
verfied the individual’s immigration status on the NCIC database; or if the
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individual did not have a valid driver’s license or identification available
during an interrogation stop, detention, or arrest.
Sadly, in most instances, noncitizens do not know that they have the right
to remain silent on if an officer inquires into immigration status, and their
admittance allows police and jailers to flag them in jail. Because police are
not supposed to enforce civil immigration violations, but inevitably are
doing so, attempts should be made to ensure that they are not singling out
noncitizens in enforcing immigration violations and notifying ICE without
reasonable suspicion based on proper articulable facts.
Across the various jurisdictions in Puget Sound, local law enforcement
agencies are dealing with immigrants in different ways. In Seattle, for
example, deputies act under an official policy that prohibits them from
inquiring about an individual’s legal status. 138 Conversely, in other cities
and counties, unwritten policies and individual discretion guide law
enforcement officers dealing with immigrants. Many Washington cities and
counties are working directly with ICE to target undocumented immigrants,
and their justification for involving ICE ranges broadly. 139 For example, in
Lynnwood, ICE officers go on ride-alongs and share desk space with the
Lynnwood Police Department. 140 These statewide informal ties with ICE
were initiated because of a demand for public safety, yet public safety is not
ultimately improved by the police having an informal relationship with ICE
and enforcing immigration law. 141
A. Pretexts Throughout Washington: The Impact and Foreseeable
Consequences of Police Overstepping
1. ICE as Interpreters
However, reports of police not only enforcing immigration laws, but
improperly using ICE interpreters are becoming more frequent in
Washington. In Mason County, the sheriff’s office detained, arrested, and
subsequently deported twenty-four Guatemalans for alleged brush theft. 142
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Upon detaining the individuals, police officers called ICE for
interpretation assistance because they could not find anyone who spoke
Mam, despite the fact that local Mam interpreters were reportedly
available. 143 When local police enforce immigration law, opportunities
arise for even more egregious behavior. Under Regulation 1.00.040, every
effort should be made to obtain interpreter assistance from sources other
than ICE; ICE translators should only be used when all other sources are
reasonably unavailable. 144
2. Informal Relationships: ICE and Local Law Enforcement
Similar to the Mason County incident, the city of Lynnwood also justifies
police collaboration with ICE. Lynnwood gives courtesy desk space to ICE
agents at the local police station station. This informal relationship between
Lynnwood and ICE also consists of ICE agents going on ride-alongs with
Lynnwood officers in cases that involve suspected “illegal aliens”—
particularly if the investigation pertains to gang activity. 145 The city of
Bothell, Washington, also works with ICE directly; Shannon Sessions, ICE
spokeswoman, stated about the relationship, “It’s a convenient arrangement
and has been helpful for educating our officers.” 146
This close and informal relationship with ICE creates many problems and
runs the risk of violating individual civil rights. For example, if police
officers and ICE agents are going on ride-alongs together and they
encounter an individual who could be undocumented, police cannot make
an arrest unless they have probable cause to assume that a crime has taken
place. However, ICE agents are able to interrogate and subsequently arrest
“any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain
in the United States” without a warrant. 147 Thus, not only could police be
facilitating the enforcement of immigration laws without authority, but they
could be making investigatory stops on ICE’s cue and arresting individuals
unlawfully with standards that fall short of the requisite reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, but are in accordance with ICE authority.
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In localities where ICE and city police officers team together and share
resources, such as in Lynnwood, crime prevention is seemingly oriented
towards the enforcement of immigration laws. 148 For example, in ridealongs, Lynnwood police officers have arrested individuals for having a
missing taillight, and the ICE agent accompanying the police officer has
subsequently inquired into the individuals’ immigration statuses. 149
Another example is the arrest and ensuing deportation of a Lynnwood
resident by an immigration officer when the resident attempted to pay a
traffic fine. 150 In Lynnwood, the chair of the Community of Color
Coalition, Kinuko Nobirikawa, stated that “[i]nformation provided . . . by
citizens and community groups indicates that the Lynnwood Police
Department is actively working with ICE in setting up check points,
stopping and detaining persons suspected by ICE.” 151 Lynnwood called
ICE to help them deal with gangs but instead used ICE to help stop people
based on their race and inquire about immigration papers when they had
been involved in something as minor as a traffic incident. A nexus indeed
exists between ICE and local police; however, this partnership is not
authorized by federal law, designated in an MOA, or worthwhile to the
community.
3. Case Study from Pacific, Washington
a) Increased Deportation Proceedings
Encounters with law enforcement in Pacific, Washington, often leave
undocumented individuals in deportation proceedings. 152 According to the
City of Pacific police records, the largest amount of police activity between
August 12, 2007, and August 30, 2007, consisted of transporting people to
immigration detention centers. 153 Pacific Lt. Edwin Massey tells his
officers that they should pursue immigration issues, even though the
department has no specific immigration enforcement policy. 154 Under the
guise of a traffic stop, Pacific police are using racial profiling to scan

VOLUME 7 • ISSUE 1 • 2008

343

344 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

people’s driver’s licenses and question their immigration statuses. 155 Lt.
Massey teaches officers that a police officer’s first clue that a motorist’s
immigration status is in question may come when the officer runs a driver’s
license and gets all zeros in place of a Social Security number. 156
Since January 2008, people have been pulled over by Pacific police for
incredibly minor traffic violations, such as not having enough air in their
tires. 157 In September 2007, local police harassed and arrested a Pacific
man, in the United States on a visitor visa, after his car was hit by another
driver. 158 The man was detained after showing his Mexican driver’s
license. In Washington, it is legal to drive with a foreign driver’s license
for up to one year; a community activist pointed out, “Canadians do it all
the time and never deal with these problems.” 159 Yet in this case, a man
was arrested despite showing his visa and was detained at the jail until the
next morning.
While he was held in jail, he was unnecessarily
fingerprinted—because he had a visa—and charged a fee for the process. 160
Given such incidents, Pacific Mayor Richard Hildreth gave a public order
to the Pacific Police Department to stop inquiring about immigration status;
however, six additional people were detained for “immigration violations”
subsequently. 161 Commenting on the large numbers of immigrants detained
after encounters with local police, Police Chief Calkins of Pacific stated,
“I’m proud of my officers and the job they’re doing. I told them if there’s a
violation, whether federal, state, whatever, they’re not to just turn their
backs on it.” 162
Across Washington, deportation may ensue after a mere encounter with
police or hosted ICE agents. Tactics like those of the Pacific Police
Department inevitably lead to the detention and deportation of individuals
who often have no criminal record and are merely in the United States
without legal authority. After being detained by police officers and brought
into custody, these individuals must remain in jail and await their transfer to
an immigration detention facility, such as the one in Tacoma, WA. 163 In
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cities in Washington, this wait is long and becoming longer as space in
Tacoma becomes less available. 164
b) The “How To” of Immigration Enforcement
In response to a public record request, Sgt. Picket of the Pacific Police
Department released his 2007 memo outlining “how to do immigration
violations.” 165 In the memo, Sgt. Picket explains, “I ask them directly if
they are illegal. Most of the time they say yes. Sometimes they tell me I
don’t have the right to ask about that. At that point, I detain them for
investigation of the immigration violation and put them in the back seat.”
He then concludes “The violation comes here from the US Code Title 8. In
spite of what people in the immigrant community are being told, you have
every right to investigate all violations of the law, including this one. I may
not be politically correct, but we are law enforcement officers and our job is
to enforce the law.” 166 Thus, Sgt. Picket misleads his officers to the
detriment of the immigrant community and the public safety of all
communities.
c) Fear and Distrust: Community Members React
As Sgt. Picket misleads Pacific police officers to believe that their role is
to enforce immigration laws, he and his officers create a sense of
apprehension and fear in the immigrant community to the detriment of
public safety. Though Chief Calkins of Pacific charges that the fear is
being generated by “white activists and outside Hispanic people,” it
undoubtedly has other sources. 167 Other city council members in Pacific
have accused community organizers of being agitators and of creating fears
about nonexistent practices, and they say that if the Hispanic community in
Pacific is really concerned, its members should be at city council
meetings. 168 However, at city council meetings, individuals have been
asked outright if they are illegal, thus clearly indicating that anywhere that
police officers are present is not a safe place to be in Pacific. 169
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Community organizers were left worried and waiting. In September
2007, feeling that more needed to be done than attending council meetings,
the Hispanic community in Pacific planned a march. 170 The organizers
contacted the city of Pacific to ask what kinds of permits were necessary for
the march and were told that there was no process. However, four days
before the event, Mayor Hildreth stated that the march was in violation of a
pedestrian code and that all participants in the march would be arrested. 171
In addition, a public records request was made for a document covering the
entire year with details similar to the one provided earlier about police
behavior; the response to the request was that “there is no requirement to
create public records based upon a request for records.” 172 In all attempts to
understand the situation in Pacific and speak out about the city police’s
misguided understanding of the law, community organizers have been met
with resistance.
A letter from the Commission on Hispanic Affairs to Pacific Mayor
Hildreth raised an important point: “because the majority of immigrants
have come from developing countries where the government is traditionally
corrupt and abusive . . . many cannot even see a uniformed officer without
triggering traumatic memories.” 173 To the immigrant community, the
blossoming police state in Washington is not about creating public safety; it
is about enforcing immigration. This culture of abuse of power and distrust
of local law enforcement is becoming more common place in Washington, a
state considered to be immigrant friendly. 174 According to the PEW
Hispanic Center, between two hundred thousand and two hundred fifty
thousand Washington State residents are undocumented. 175 With such a
large number of undocumented residents, local police must be wary of the
potential impact of their enforcement authority.
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V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
This article has outlined many of the consequences that ensue when state
and local police enforce immigration law. Furthermore, it has argued that
allowing state and local officers to enforce immigration law is a mistake.
The following sections list both long-term and short-term proposals to limit
police enforcement of immigration laws and promote the public safety of
those in the community. These proposals also will be beneficial to our
communities, empower individuals to come forth and report violent
criminals, and uphold our constitutional rights.
A. Proposals for Change on the National Front
1. Reform of Federal Law
Fixing the immigration system requires reforming federal laws; it does
not require influencing local police to take on this work independently or
mandating they enforce immigration laws via an MOA. 176 Some states and
localities endorse using restrictive and punitive measures aimed at making
their communities less hospitable to immigrants.
However, a
nonsegregating and comprehensive reform policy will ensure that a realitybased approach to immigration enforcement incorporates immigrants into
the community recognizing them as a key ingredient of shared
prosperity. 177
How local agencies respond to the call to enforce
immigration laws will fundamentally affect the way they police and serve
their communities.
2. Removal of Civil Immigration Detainers from the NCIC System
Removing the civil immigration detainers from the NCIC would decrease
the complexity of the NCIC system and contribute to the enforcement of
criminal matters. The integrity of the NCIC system as a notice system for
criminal warrants and criminal matters must be maintained. The inclusion
of civil detainers in the system has created confusion for local police
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agencies and has subjected them to possible liability for exceeding their
authority by arresting individuals on the basis of a mere civil immigration
violation. 178 Therefore, in situations where an individual is arrested for a
civil violation in the NCIC system, local agencies must require that police
officers request a federal criminal warrant before making any immigration
related arrest. 179
B. Proposals for Change on the Local Front
Police need to understand their duties and the consequences of their
behavior. Clear division between immigration enforcement and criminal
justice enforcement must be drawn. Similarly, the role of police and their
authority to enforce immigration law must be properly outlined. If law
enforcement makes it clear that the reporting of a crime—such as burglary,
rape, or murder—will not trigger an investigation into the immigration
status of the witness, the entire community will be safer because deportation
would not be a looming possibility. In order for this to happen, a very
strong division must exist between state and local law enforcement and
those police and FBI agents—such as those dealing with trafficking issues
and human smuggling—who assist the federal government in the
enforcement of civil immigration laws. 180 In order to create a strong
division between authorities, this section provides the following
suggestions.
1. “Don’t Ask” Ordinances
In Washington, Seattle is a model city for immigration purposes. Seattle
Municipal Code 4.18.015, the “Don’t Ask” ordinance, states that “unless
otherwise required by law or by court order, no Seattle City officer or
employee shall inquire into the immigration status of any person or engage
in activities designed to ascertain the immigration status of any person.” 181
In 2003, Seattle sucessfully attempted to raise awareness of immigrant
presence by highlighting immigrants’ colorful cultural heritage and social
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vivacity. 182 Moreover, Seattle acknowledged that as an equal service
provider to all residents, 183 an obligation existed to respond to the attacks of
9/11 by addressing individual fears of being reported to ICE. 184 When
enacted, Don’t Ask ordinances promote efforts of police and public health
departments to cooperate with immigrant communities in order to reduce
crime and improve public safety in those communities. 185
Most importantly, Seattle acknowledges that all of its city officers and
employees should be afforded guidance with respect to inquiries into
immigration status. 186 The Don’t Ask ordinance enacted in Seattle has
made immigrants part of the community, not second-class citizens afraid to
contribute to the social welfare in their area. The ordinance has also given
procedural order to past questions police had when dealing with
immigration enforcement. Don’t Ask ordinances list the ways in which city
officials and employees can provide support to immigrants and adhere to
federal law. 187 When faced with the question of a criminal suspect’s
identity, an officer should proceed in the same way he or she would with
any suspect in that situation, asking for all forms of identification that do
not require asking about immigration status. If the officer is not satisfied
with the suspect’s identity, then he or she can proceed with an arrest or a
citation pursuant to the law or department policy. 188
Confidentiality policies, like the Don’t Ask ordinance in Seattle, treat
immigration status as a confidential matter and prohibit inquiry. Though
proponents of immigration restrictions in police matters argue that
confidentiality policies do not protect communities from undocumented
immigrants who commit crimes, immigrants who commit crimes are
arrested and treated like any other potential criminal. 189 In a 2007 audit, the
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General found that such
policies in the jurisdictions it surveyed did not violate federal law and did
not impede police cooperation with ICE regarding criminals in police
custody. 190 Once the individuals are in custody, ICE can detain them;
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however, police should not enforce immigration laws or place immigration
detainers on individuals—that is ICE’s job.
Immigration status should not be used to feed noncitizens, through the
criminal justice system, into ICE’s hands. Criminals are subject to the
criminal justice system. Eventually, these criminals will enter into the
immigration enforcement system as well, but only once they are
apprehended and channeled out of the criminal justice system. Criminal
justice and immigration are not one and the same, and should not be treated
the same by police officers. If immigration status is to become a question
of importance in criminal enforcement and if immigration enforcement is to
fall under the jurisdiction of a police officer’s duty, then accountability
must be assured to validate everyone’s civil liberties. Given that police do
not understand their duties clearly and only a few localities implement
Don’t Ask ordinances, Miranda warnings should be implicated when
immigration is questioned, allowing every individual to understand the
consequences in both the immigration and criminal justice systems.
2. Defining Officer Duty and Training Police Without MOAs
The authority of state and local police must be clearly defined. When a
locality has a policy that defines a police officer’s limits, community
leaders and advocates are better able to explain roles and expectations to
both the immigrant population and the police. A local policy that clarifies
state and local police authority and dissuades police from immigration
enforcement enables and encourages police departments to educate their
members on issues that could impose liability, for example, in dealing with
a matched name from the NCIC subfiles. 191
a) Training to Create Trust
Police must understand the demographics of their community, and as
ethnic populations grow, attitudes must reflect responsiveness and
understanding. Diversity training to all city employees on an annual basis
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will help to create an immigrant-friendly attitude. 192 If police make an
effort to be viewed as members of the community, the fear and distrust will
be dispelled. Once trust is gained, police can begin to host community
forums in safe locations, such as faith-based environments, that will address
the concerns of immigrants and allow them to serve as vigilant community
members. As diversity grows in cities such as Lynnwood, police must be
more watchful of their actions. The goal is that some day, police can even
sponsor a Cinco de Mayo festival or multicultural fair, where information
about police, safety, and other city services can be informally distributed
without creating fear in the immigrant community given police presence. 193
In order to create trust and promote protection in immigrant communities,
police departments should make an effort to properly train and motivate
their employees. For example, police and city employers should explore
incentive-based pay and recruitment efforts for bilingual staff who can
speak primary languages other than English. 194 Police and city staff should
increase recruitment for city job, board, and commission positions to better
reflect the demographics of their cities. Recruiting, hiring, and training a
more diverse police force will allow members of the immigrant population
to relate to officers that look like them.
The politics of immigration are very complex. Dialogue with community
activists and legal advocates can be a valuable method to educate police
officers with respect to immigration enforcement of civil immigration, the
implications of their actions on the community, and the costly consequences
of racial profiling, and police officers should be involved in decisionmaking respective to each of these issues. 195
b) Training and Racial Profiling Safeguards
Trainings for police officers on racial profiling and immigration
enforcement should be mandatory, and community organizations and
lawyers should train police, alongside ICE, to assure that all have the same
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standards. It is of utmost importance that police officers be informed of the
parameters of their role and be held accountable for their actions.
Police should develop a database to record the number of arrests they
make where ICE is called, immigration status is questioned, or detainers are
issued. It is difficult to hold police accountable for abuse when data is not
made available and immigrants are afraid to make reports. Thus, lawyers
and community organizations should continue documenting and monitoring
how police are treating immigrants; how immigrants are responding to
reports of police officials stopping, arresting, and detaining individuals for
civil immigration violations; and how police are inquiring into immigration
status and dealing with questionable status. 196 Collecting and monitoring
data will promote transparency and allow for accountability, thus
preventing future suits and costly litigation. Finally, it will provide
immigrants with a voice to reflect the injustices they face.
c) Immigration Detainers at State and Local Jails
Accountability within local and county jails is also another high priority.
Understanding the strategies that police and ICE use to identify individuals
and acknowledging the delays and complications with transfers will help
highlight potential constitutional claims and relief for immigrants in jail.
Jails must hand over public records to community organizations and
lawyers studying the process in order to comprehend the actual policies and
practices of the jailers and ICE. 197
Furthermore, jailers and ICE should work together in jails when dealing
with individuals who have questionable immigration status and serious
criminal charges, as those charges will likely lead to severe consequences in
the immigration system. Nonetheless, the way in which jailers identify
nationality and immigration status must be lawful and preceded by a
Miranda warning. Flagging those who were arrested for mere civil
infractions and identifying those people as “aliens” for ICE review based on
their place of birth or foreign-sounding name seems more anti-immigrant
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than helpful. An absolutely critical response to the immigration detainer is
a call to give Miranda warnings if questioning about immigration status on
intake forms at jails. 198 Miranda warnings, though not currently required in
immigration enforcement issues, should be implicated when immigration is
questioned because a noncitizen should be granted the right to understand
the consequences that would ensue in both the immigration and criminal
justice system if they listed a place of birth on an intake form,.
The implications of any and all statements made in jail and during arrest
should be addressed in a Miranda warning. The jailer should also avoid
making any reports to ICE regarding noncitizens, unless such information
came after a Miranda warning. 199 Giving a Miranda warning to individuals
before they state anything that could potentially lead to an immigration hold
would assure that ICE focuses their attention on interviewing and holding
people with severe criminal charges and harsh consequences in the
immigration system. In that sense, burglars, domestic violence abusers,
drug traffickers, and other violent arrestees who, once out of the criminal
justice system would likely face aggravated felony charges in the
immigration system, would fall into the hands of ICE. A Miranda warning
would not only assure that rights are granted to all arrestees but would also
ensure that attention is paid where attention is due. Driving without a
license and being a drug trafficker are two distinguishable crimes, each
implicating much more than just duration of time served. ICE is
extraordinarily busy when visiting jails, and if ICE were better able to work
to ensure that those who threaten public safety are processed by both the
criminal justice system and the immigration system, efficiency will be
enhanced and justice better served.
A clear division in authorities between police and ICE must be outlined
in order to detain those who truly deserve to be detained by ICE.
Immigrants are quickly learning to avoid answering questions to police and
on intake forms, and sooner than later, police and ICE will have to employ a
different strategy. Thus, immigration inquiries at jails should be made only
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for those individuals suspected of violating criminal immigration laws, and
Miranda warnings should be read to all individuals before they implicate
themselves
3. Community Education
Education is a fundamental step in the pro-immigrant struggle. If and
when the appropriate effort is made, perhaps education—the most obvious
means of individual empowerment—will prevent much of the struggle
ensuing from police enforcement of immigration laws. First, as discussed
above, police must enter into a respectful relationship with immigrants.
Subsequently, in order to provide immigrants with the necessary
educational tools, the educational syllabus must provide both a basic and a
complex agenda. Both police officers and immigrants must be properly
educated on the pertinent enforcement issues. Trusted community leaders
and lawyers can be instrumental in taking the first steps towards educating
immigrants about city services and the role of the police. 200
Moreover, immigrant communities should be aware of the law in their
state and locality. Oftentimes, having a Don’t Ask ordinance in a city is not
enough if immigrants are not aware of the ordinance. Police officers,
community groups, and other pro-immigrant programs should promote the
law. Encouraging immigrants who are crime victims or who are aware of
illegal activity to come forward without fear of arrest should be an inherent
goal of all.
Lastly, educating and preparing the immigrant community for
enforcement actions is also invaluable. 201 Such education can be done by
utilizing the media outlets and developing enforcement information packets
for families. 202 A communication plan should be developed to inform the
community about local police enforcement issues. By knowing that the
community cares about issues affecting immigrants, it is more likely that
immigrants will attend education and enforcement meetings.
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4. Community Organizers Response
Community organizers and activists play a key role in the advancement
of immigrant rights in communities where state and local police are
unavailable and unresponsive. Community organizers, working with police,
can provide multilingual newsletters and support citizen education
awareness efforts. They can also partner with key government officials,
local agencies, ethnically owned businesses, and diverse faith-based
organizations to disseminate information and highlight positive stories of
police and immigrants working together. 203 Doing so will create forums for
educational outreach and ultimately result in a positive perception of police.
Long-term goals such as supporting partnerships that provide English as a
second language classes, citizenship instructions, and other resources for
communities will allow police and community members to better
understand each other.
Suggestions for community responses include working with social
service agencies and local police to pool resources. For example, agencies
can create and prepare a database of the names and contact information for
volunteer translators or develop ways to fund translators; establish a tollfree phone number for individuals to call when they or their family member
faces a run-in with police and their immigration status was questioned; and
create a network of counselors, social workers, and clergy who can provide
counseling. 204 The community organizers’ efforts, alongside police efforts
to avoid immigration enforcement, will inevitably receive a positive
response from immigrant community members.
Lastly, community organizers should use the media effectively and to
their benefit. This can be accomplished through the development of a list of
individuals who can talk to the media and who can work closely with
programs such as Univision or Radio Sol to inform the immigrant
community of issues affecting them. Open communication will ultimately
lead to increased trust. Moreover, it is also valuable to develop
relationships with national organizations that can help with media
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strategy. 205 By working together, broadcasting issues affecting immigrants,
and giving immigrants a forum to always turn to for assistance, the
community can work together to stay aware and informed.
5. Legal Services Response
In addition, legal services should anticipate police enforcement issues
when defending immigrants in criminal or immigration proceedings.
Attorneys should understand how to advise victims who fear immigrationrelated inquiries when dealing with police. Furthermore, legal services can
assist in providing advice to those agencies, including the police and other
social service agencies, about the constitutional and criminal authorities in
place. Attorneys can determine the level of commitment and the need for
training and translators; they can give “Know Your Rights” presentations;
and most importantly, immigration and defense attorneys can work closely
together to assure that immigrants’ rights are being upheld when threatened
by collaboration between police and ICE. 206

VI. CONCLUSION
Laws, ordinances, and informal policies encouraging police control in
immigration enforcement matters must be discouraged. It is all the more
important to establish local policies that preserve effective community
policing and protect immigrants’ rights from the overstepping of state and
local police officers. Today in Washington and across the United States,
strong policies that protect immigrants’ access to police protection are
pitted against enforcment policies that encourage police to enforce
immigration laws. The political pressure to introduce anti-immigrant
measures has not only created an unprecedented surge in state-level
lawmaking, but also spurred rising resentment in the country. 207 As
Washington Governor Christine Gregoire stated, “the lack of
comprehensive reform at the federal level places an additional burden on
law enforcement officials.” 208 Let us not burden law enforcement with
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immigration issues, but rather keep them focused on enforcing criminal
justice and promoting public safety.
It is extremely important that we limit police authority in the immigration
realm and implement strategies to improve communication between the
immigrant community and police. Enforcement of immigration law by state
and local police does not encourage public safety; rather, it deflects
resources that promote and encourage individual well-being. Allowing
state and local officers to enforce immigration laws only contributes to this
xenophobic and anti-immigrant approach. It is for the benefit of all
communities that state and local police refrain from enforcing civil
immigration laws.
The line between police assisting the federal government and police
enforcing immigration laws is thin. Advocating that criminal aliens be
detained and arrested by state and local police officers ignores the fact that
police already have the authority to arrest criminals, both in enforcing state
or local laws and in assisting the federal government. Everyone in the
United States is subject to American law, and likewise, everyone in the
United States should feel as though the officers who serve their
communities are protecting them, not threatening the community with their
presence.
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